ORGANIZATIONAL CORRECTIVES FOR IMPROVING RECOGNITION OF NEAR-MISS EVENTS
After most catastrophes, prior near-misses are identified. Near-misses are events that have some non-trivial expectation of ending in a bad outcome but, by chance, do not. Research has shown that people are inherently biased to focus on the outcome of a process (Baron & Hershey, 1988) , so that over time when events have no obvious signs of imminent disaster, people begin to confidently view these near-miss events as successes (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008) .
Other research (Tinsley, Dillon & Cronin, 2012) has examined how features of the near-miss itself (specifically, whether or not danger information is salient) prompt closer scrutiny of nearmiss events. In this research, we focus specifically on those near-miss events that do not come with blatantly recognizable danger signs and examine the corresponding challenges that these types of near-misses pose for organizations.
For example, the Columbia orbiter was lost on February 1, 2003, because of damage sustained during launch when a piece of foam insulation broke off the main propellant tank and struck the leading edge of the left wing, damaging the thermal protection system. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) identified (from imagery that was available) significant hazardous foam-loss on at least 79 prior shuttle launches and the same piece of foam from the left bipod ramp that damaged Columbia broke off on at least 7 previous missions (CAIB, 2003, p. 53) . On all of these previous missions, good fortune intervened; the foam debris did not hit a sensitive portion of the orbiter, creating near-misses rather than failures. Since no serious adverse effects of the foam shedding were observed on previous missions, over time, NASA managers came to accept foam loss as a normal occurrence, and this near-miss outcome came to be viewed as a successful launch where any damage from foam debris was considered a maintenance problem to be fixed between missions. In research after the earlier Challenger accident, Diane
Vaughan referred to a similar pattern of what she called "normalizing deviance" in perceptions of the O-rings performance, in that un-predicted but not catastrophic O-ring results came to be viewed as a benign deviance (Vaughan, 1996 ; see also Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) .
Other, non-NASA examples abound-on July 25, 2000, an Air France Concord airliner (Air France flight 4590) crashed, killing all 100 passengers and 9 flight crew on board as well as four people on the ground. The technical cause of the disaster was damage to the aircraft's engines and fuel tanks sustained when a tire ruptured during take-off. The accident investigation identified 57 previous tire bursts or deflations 1 that occurred during take-offs before the Concorde's fatal flight (BEA, 2000, p. 93) . In one prior incident, the damage was similar to the fatal flight except again good fortune intervened and the leaking jet fuel did not catch fire. In the oil exploration industry, data have emerged showing that British Petroleum routinely risked disaster and ignored many near-misses on the Deepwater Horizon rig prior to the April 2010 accident and oil spill (Mufson, 2010) .
Studies of the antecedents of these and other large disasters find that, despite the enormity of their effects, disasters are rarely generated by large causes. Instead disasters are produced by combinations of small failures and errors across the entire organizational system. As a result, safety scientists often refer to large-scale organizational disasters as "system accidents" (Reason, 1990) or "normal accidents" (Perrow, 1984) . The common approach for protecting these types of complex organizational systems is to create layers of defenses so that system failure can occur only when all the holes in the defenses line up (i.e., the "swiss cheese" model of defense, Reason, 1997) . However, even if the system defense is working correctly, small "latent" errors in system design or organizational practice can go undetected for long periods of time if they produce only near-misses without signs of imminent disaster. In many cases, the difference between a disaster and a near-miss is simply a bad draw from a complex stochastic process, such as the size and trajectory of the foam shedding on the shuttle that causes damage to a critical system component. Thus, across a wide range of disciplines, people agree that the most viable approach to minimizing the likelihood of system accidents and resultant organizational disasters is to observe near-misses (which are more common than failures) and use these events to identify and eliminate the small, nondescript, latent errors before they produce a catastrophe (Barach & Small, 2000; Marcus & Nichols, 1999; Reason, 1990 Reason, , 1997 Rerup, 2009; Tamuz, 2001; Turner, 1978) .
Despite the value of recognizing near-misses, scholars argue that these events remain vastly underreported in virtually all industries (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; Reason, 1997; Tamuz, 2001) . One primary reason for this underreporting of near-misses is that people often fail to 1 Of the tire bursts/deflations, thirty occurred within the Air France fleet and twenty-seven within British Airways. Of the fifty-seven events, twelve had structural consequences for the wings and/or the fuel tanks, of which six led to penetration of the tanks; nineteen of the tire bursts/deflations were caused by foreign objects; and twenty-two events occurred during takeoff.
recognize the event as a near-miss. Identifying near-misses requires a subjective interpretation of prior events. In most cases there is not an obviously bad outcome, but instead only a slight deviation from normal that a person has to interpret as a potentially larger problem. Research indicates that decision makers frequently interpret prior near-misses as successes rather than problems or failures (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008) , likely due to an outcome bias (Baron & Hershey, 1988) , and consequently fail to extract valuable information from them. Moreover, this tendency may compound over time because of the normalization of deviance that occurs in organizations (Vaughan, 1996) such that the ability to recognize anomalies and document them may decrease over time and only increase again if triggered by the occasional large failure.
Data from NASA's space shuttle missions through 2010 seem to illustrate this phenomenon. As Figure 1 shows, the number of reported in-flight anomalies slopes downward over time, until the 1986 Challenger disaster. After this disaster, reporting spikes upward, but then as time goes on the trend again slopes downward, until the Columbia disaster. The same upward spike and then downward slope pattern appears following Columbia. These downward trends in reported in-flight anomalies are undoubtedly due, in part, to a decrease in the number of anomalies actually occurring during shuttle flights as shuttle technology matured. However, it is unlikely that the spikes in reported anomalies following Challenger and Columbia reflect an increase in true anomaly frequency. Rather, this pattern suggests that clear failures (Challenger, Columbia) trigger enhanced vigilance in searching for near-misses. But this vigilance decreases over time so that near-misses are less noticed because of the resulting successful outcome.
The purpose of this paper is to examine ways to keep people vigilant in identifying nearmisses in the absence of large obvious failures (and to hopefully prevent future large failures because of the increased vigilance). To that end, we hypothesize mechanisms grounded in decision theory (about outcome and near-miss biases) but also inspired by safety research, which calls for viable organizational interventions. We propose two mechanisms, organizational messages that: 1) safety is important and 2) the project is significant, as ways to improve people's recognition of near-miss events and thus improve organizational decision making. We test these hypotheses in an empirical analysis of near-misses reported during a set of unmanned NASA missions launched between 1989 and 2010. We then explore the hypotheses in more depth in a set of experimental studies using both NASA personnel and MBA students. We use the results of the studies to describe two direct organizational interventions that can improve recognition of near-misses so that catastrophic organizational failures might be prevented in the future. These interventions have important implications for improving an organization's safety culture (Hofman and Frese, 2011) so that recognition of near-miss events occurs and for an organization's capability to learn from these events to prevent future catastrophes (Edmondson, 1999; MacPhail and Edmondson, 2011) since the events need to be recognized as warning signals before learning can occur (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005; Carroll, 1998; Levinthal and March, 1993) .
Recognizing a Near-miss
While many people realize that almost all decisions are made under uncertainty and thus relying on only the outcome is a poor measure of decision quality (Edwards, 1984) , most decision makers display a strong tendency to overweight outcomes when making judgments, i.e., the "outcome bias" (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Hershey & Baron, 1992; Mazzocco et al., 2004; McKillip & Posavac, 1975) . Dillon and Tinsley (2008) demonstrated that decision makers fall prey to the outcome bias in the context of near-misses. They found that decision makers evaluated near-misses as successes and different from failures.
Fortunately, however, it may be possible to correct the propensity to overweight outcomes in evaluating near-misses. The debiasing literature suggests that contextual cues surrounding a decision can be altered to mitigate several cognitive biases (Arkes, 1991; Benbasat & Lim, 2000; Klayman & Brown, 1993; Lilienfeld et al., 2009) , including: hindsight bias (e.g. Sanna & Schwarz, 2006) , confirmation bias (e.g. Kray & Galinsky, 2003) , recency bias (e.g. Srivastava & Raghubir, 2002) , overconfidence (e.g. Bhandari et al., 2008) and underconfidence (e.g. Koriat et al., 2006) . Contextual cues can come from organizational messages. As Heath, Larrick, and Klayman (1998) point out, oftentimes organizational "correctives" (policies, practices, implicit messages) mitigate individual level decision biases. Although Heath and colleagues fall short of suggesting organizational correctives for outcome or near-miss biases, we believe organizational messages can mitigate this bias by improving people's ability to distinguish near-miss outcomes from successes. Baron and Hershey (1988) suggest two primary causes of outcomes bias. First, people might overgeneralize from outcomes and use outcomes as a heuristic by which to evaluate process. Second, people's attention might narrow to only those pieces of process information that are consistent with the observed outcome. These causes are not necessarily mutually exclusive and suggest ways to increase recognition of near-miss events through organizational interventions. We study two here; messages about the importance of safety and the significance of the project.
Organizational Interventions. Heuristic overgeneralization in this context means that people use past outcomes as a proxy for future outcomes. This may occur because of people's tendency to discount the probabilistic nature of past, realized outcomes (Hastie & Dawes, 2001 ), so that they are seen as deterministic. If the past is deterministic and features of the decision context have not changed then it might be reasonable to infer that past outcomes approximate future outcomes. Since near-misses that we are focused on do not produce visible evidence of system danger, they are difficult to distinguish from successes when only outcomes are
processed. Yet, to apply an outcome heuristic is particularly problematic for most systems because near-misses and systems failures are generally produced by complex stochastic processes where chance plays a large role in determining whether the final outcomes is actually a failure or just a near-miss. Baron and Hershey (1988) suggest another mechanism that creates outcome bias is people's narrowing attention to only those aspects of a decision process that are consistent with the observed outcome. Here, people are paying attention to more than just the outcome (to the decision process as well) but are failing to gather all the appropriate data to include in examining the decision process. Rather, when outcomes are interpreted as positive (successes), people attend primarily to the positive aspects of the decision process, ignoring any negative processes.
When an outcome is interpreted as negative (failures), people attend primarily to the negative aspects of the decision process, and discount any positive processes. Results of Kennedy's (1995) examination of outcome bias among auditors were consistent with this attentional explanation.
To combat heuristic reliance on outcomes or selective auditing of past decisions requires making people more skeptical of the success outcome. People need to think about alternative possible outcomes or how different aspects of the decision process could lead to unexpected events. Prior research shows that an organization's messages about the importance of safety can enhance people's vigilance in identifying unexpected events, as well as their cognitive effort to make sense of and deal with those events (Hofman & Stetzer, 1998; Weick et al., 1999; Zohar, 2000) . On the other hand, organizational messages that suggest a risk-tolerance have the opposite effect (van Dyck et al., 2005) . Notably, investigations after the Columbia tragedy criticized NASA for having placed a low priority on safety, commenting that "NASA had conflicting goals of cost, schedule, and safety. Safety lost out" (CAIB, 2003: p. 200 ).
We suggest that when organizational messages emphasize risk tolerance, only blatant failures will be distinguished from other outcomes, meaning that near-miss events will be evaluated in a manner that is similar to how successes are evaluated. However, when organizational messages emphasize a priority on safety, people's vigilance in identifying unexpected events will be enhanced so that near-misses will be distinguished from successful outcomes.
Hypothesis 1a: When organizational messages focus on safety, people will identify more near-misses than when organizational messages focus on risk tolerance.
Hypothesis 1b: When organizational messages focus on safety, people will rate failure outcomes for projects differently from near-miss and success outcomes, but not differentiate between the latter two.
Hypothesis 1c: When organizational messages focus on risk tolerance, people will rate nearmiss outcomes for projects differently from success outcomes.
Another way to broaden peoples' focus on alternative outcomes and details of the decision process may be to increase general levels of cognitive effort by increasing project significance. Because our cognitive capacity limits the number of issues to which we can devote attention (Simon, 1991) , people tend to be cognitively frugal (Khaneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) , reserving effortful thinking for high-priority situations. As a result, people actively attend to only a small subset of all issues facing any organization, allowing the others to be processed more or less automatically (Ocasio, 1997; Rerup, 2009) . One key characteristic of an issue that determines the degree to which decision makers attend to it is its relative significance to the organization (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001) . When the stakes are high, expanded cognitive resources should allow for a broader, more critical perspective. Of course, more effortful thinking does not always result in better decisions (biases such as insensitivity to bases rates and sample size seem immune to cognitive effort [Simonson & Nye, 1992] ). Since near-misses are a chance-dependent outcome, we believe that categorizing near-misses as successes stems from inattention to an important decision cue-namely, that near-miss outcomes resulted in part from good fortune (Hastie & Dawes, 2001 ). Thus, relative to decision makers who believe that a given project is not of major significance for their organization, we believe that decision makers who recognize that a project is significant should examine more aspects of the situation and thus be better at identifying near-misses.
Notably, the CAIB report lamented that the significance of Columbia's launch was overshadowed by a subsequent shuttle launch that would carry the section of the International Space Station (ISS) known as Node 2, whose addition would complete a major ISS milestone known as "Core Complete." "The importance of this date [February 19, 2004] 
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Thus, when organizational messages suggest projects are less significant, there will be more of a tendency to ignore near-misses such that only blatant failures will be distinguished from other project outcomes. On the other hand, when organizational messages suggest a project is important, near-miss outcomes for a project will be distinguished from successes.
Hypothesis 2a: When organizational messages suggest a project is significant, people will identify more near-misses when organizational messages suggest a project is not significant.
Hypothesis 2b: When organizational messages suggest a project is not significant, people will rate failure outcomes from a project differently from near-miss and success outcomes, but not distinguish between the latter two.
Hypothesis 2c: When organizational messages suggest a project is significant, people will rate near-miss outcomes for a project differently from success outcomes.
Method
We test these hypotheses in 3 studies-1 based on field data and 2 experimental studies.
Study 1 examines near-miss reporting during 30 unmanned NASA missions involving NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 2 using a unique near-miss database. Study 2 looks at how organizational messages about safety influence decision makers' judgments of near-misses.
Study 3 examines how organizational messages about a project's significance influence decision makers' judgments of near-misses.
Study 1
Sample and Data. Study 1 uses a proprietary data set of JPL's Incident, Surprise, Anomaly (ISA) reports for virtually all space flight missions managed by JPL between 1989 and 2010. JPL procedures dictate that "an Incident, Surprise, Anomaly (ISA) report shall be written on all post-launch incidents, real or suspected, which indicate an anomaly in hardware, software, sequencing, test/operations procedures, etc." (Green et al., 2006) . In other words, ISA reports document identified deviations from expected performance. Since in only a handful of cases during our sampling frame an anomaly occurred that led to serious mission failure, the reported ISAs are considered identified near-misses in that they represent unexpected system performance that did not produce visible failure. Of the roughly 20,000 ISA reports in our data, less than .03%
were reported incidents that ultimately jeopardized the fulfillment of one or more scientific objectives of a mission, 2% were rated by JPL to pose a "major threat" to the mission, 17% were rated by JPL to pose a "significant threat" to the mission, and the balance were rated to pose "negligible threat" or "no threat" to the mission. The results reported below remain materially unchanged when the incidents that contributed to failure are excluded from the data, as well as when the incidents rated to be major or significant threats are excluded. Thus, the sample of ISA reports is a sample of identified near-misses. should not impact the generalizibility of our results. Because some of our independent and control variables change over time-such as mission phase (see below)--we segmented ISAs for each mission by month, meaning that our final sample consisted of one observation for each mission for each month it was in operation-a total of 2,325 mission-months for the 30 missions.
Variables. The dependent variable of interest in this study was the frequency of near-miss reporting. Consequently, as our dependent variable, we constructed a count of the number of ISAs reported by month for each JPL mission. We refer to this variable as Near-Miss Reports.
We employed two independent variables in this study. Organizational messages about safety (Hypothesis 1) were constructed using naturally occurring variance in our database. From
April 1992 to November 2001, Daniel Goldin served as NASA administrator, during which time the organization adopted a "faster, better, cheaper" (FBC) mantra to embody his view that NASA should undertake more frequent, but more risky missions. Although the overall effectiveness of the FBC strategy is open for debate (it drastically reduced the average cost of an unmanned mission, but also produced several highly visible failures and was discontinued after Goldin's departure), it does offer a naturally occurring variance in organizational messaging about safety.
We take advantage of this variance to construct our first independent variable-Risk
Acceptance-which takes a value of 1 for missions that were planned during NASA's FBC era (when a risk tolerant safety message was promoted) and a value of 0 for other missions.
Our second independent variable tracked perceived mission significance, corresponding to Hypothesis 2. We operationalized this variable as a count of the number of articles in major news outlets devoted to a given mission published within the period of 1 week before mission launch to 1 week after mission launch (the counts were performed by searching on the "Major World Publications" index in LexisNexis). The two week time frame was chosen as a standard since the actual mission durations varied greatly in the data set (the duration of missions in the sample ranged from less than a day for a few missions that failed during launch to more than 18 years for the Ulysses probe, with a mean of about 5 years). This variable-labeled Mission Significance-was then logged to reduce skewness.
We also included several control variables. The first control was an indicator variable that took a value of 1 for missions where JPL was the primary mission manager and a value of 0 for missions where JPL was only managing a subcomponent of the mission (for several missions in the sample, JPL managed 1 or more scientific instruments on the spacecraft, but did not manage the overall mission). The variable accounted for the fact that more near-misses are reported in JPL's ISA reports for missions managed by JPL. Second, we accounted for the technical complexity of a mission using several control variables, including: the mass of the spacecraft (or the portion of the spacecraft managed by JPL for missions where JPL was not the primary mission manager), the development cost of a mission (or the portion of the mission managed by JPL), the number of formal mission objectives a mission was designed to complete, and the number of different scientific instruments carried by a spacecraft. Together, these variables account for the possibility that more technologically complex missions generate a greater number of near-misses than less complex missions. We also included a variable to indicate whether or not a spacecraft had already completed its primary mission (many spacecraft in the sample were given extended missions once their primary objectives had been met), a variable to indicate whether the spacecraft entered into orbit around a planet or other object during a given month, and a variable to indicate whether the spacecraft, or a part of it, attempted to land on a planet or other object during a given month (both entering orbit and landing are actions that present more opportunities for near-misses to occur).
Analysis. Because our dependent variable was a count, we conducted preliminary analyses using both Poisson and Negative Binomial regression, as count data may be accurately approximated by both the Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions. Because a set of likelihood ratio tests comparing the two approaches generated large and statistically significant χ2 statistics (thus rejecting the assumptions of the Poisson model), all of the reported models utilized Negative Binomial regression. Moreover, since the data contain multiple observations of each mission, the data are clustered by mission. To the extent that observations of the same mission are correlated, this clustering would violate the assumptions of the negative binomial model. Several common approaches for correcting such clustering, such as fixed effects, random effects, and hierarchical models are inappropriate here because they would report within-mission variation but mask variation between missions (which is the focus of the analysis here because the two independent variables vary only between missions, not within missions). Consequently, we employed generalized estimating equation (GEE) population averaged models to account for clustering of observations by mission. GEE population averaged models correct for clustering while exploring variation across the population, not within individual missions. Thus, all reported models are GEE population averaged negative binomial models.
Results. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for all Study 1 variables. As can be seen, none of the pairwise correlations is large enough to suggest that the results are impacted by multicollinearity.
-----------------
Insert Table 1 about here Table 2 contains the results of the GEE population averaged Negative Binomial regression models. Model 1 contains only the control variables, indicating that several controls are significant predictors of near-miss reporting. A greater number of near-misses were reported for missions managed by JPL (as opposed to involving JPL in a smaller role), for more expensive spacecraft, for missions with a greater number of scientific objectives, and during months in which a spacecraft enters into orbit around or lands on a planet or other object.
Additionally, fewer near-misses are reported for missions that cost more per kg of mass and during months after a spacecraft has completed its primary mission. Interestingly, the number of instruments on a spacecraft was not a significant predictor of near-miss reporting. However, the findings of Study 1 alone are insufficient to demonstrate that these contextual factors improve near-miss recognition because they cannot rule out the possibility that the observed results are driven by other, non-cognitive factors, such as incentives. For example, if organizational messages about safety and project significance are related to incentives for near-miss reporting, it may be that these factors do not impact near-miss recognition, but only alter the likelihood that recognized near-misses will be reported. Because we do not have data on near-miss reporting incentives, we cannot test this alternative explanation directly in Study 1.
Consequently, to examine these issues in greater detail, we conducted a series of experiments designed to explore the cognitive aspects of contextual repairs of near-miss identification more directly.
Studies 2& 3: Manipulating Organizational Messages
In our two experimental studies, we test each of our two hypotheses separately. In the tasks, participants are asked to evaluate the performance of the project manager of a hypothetical unmanned NASA mission, Chris, whose actions lead to a success, a failure, or a near-miss. The scenario was originally developed using historical case data currently available at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) compiled by their Knowledge Management Office. 3 The initial motivation came from two projects, WIRE (Wide-Field Infrared Explorer) and TIMED (Thermosphere Ionosphere Mesosphere Energetics and Dynamics Project), that offered interesting contrasts. TIMED was considered a success, having achieved its minimum science requirements, while WIRE was considered a failure. Yet, discussions conducted for the case studies clarified that either project could have been a failure or a success. The outcomes were due in a large part to luck; that is, both had problems that could have ended the project, though this only occurred in one case. Moreover, both had similar process characteristics: they involved multiple NASA centers, shifting personnel, unclear reporting relationships, ambiguous testing standards, and technical anomalies. The appendix shows the simulation material developed.
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Study 2: Different Safety Messages. We employed a 33 factorial design crossing project outcome (success, failure, and near-miss) with safety message (risk tolerant, safety-first, control = no message regarding safety).
Participants and procedure. Participants in Study 2 were NASA managers and contractors (N=185) and graduate business students (N=199). NASA managers and contractors participated as part of a training course in project management or as volunteers at a major NASA aerospace conference. MBA students participated at the request of their peers in return for a charitable donation by the researchers.
Independent variables:
For project outcome, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, either the project ended in a success, a near-miss, or a failure. See Appendix for exact wording to describe each outcome condition. For safety message, in the risk tolerant condition, participants read: "As you know, NASA, which pushes the frontiers of knowledge, must operate in a high risk, risk-tolerant environment." In the safety-focus condition, participants read: "As you know, NASA, as a highly visible organization, must operate in a high-safety, safety-first environment." In the control condition, the participants were given no information regarding the organization's message for safety.
Dependent variable. After reading Chris' decisions and the project outcome, participants
were asked to evaluate Chris on a number of different metrics: competence, intelligence, decision making ability, leadership ability, whether or not Chris should be given a larger project, and whether or not Chris should be fired (reverse coded), all assessed with 7-point Likert scales (1= very bad to 7= very good).
Analysis and results.
Factor analysis showed that all the dependent variable metrics (evaluations of Chris) loaded onto a single factor (explaining 54% of the data). So a scale was created of these ratings by averaging each participants response (scale alpha = .84).
Results showed no main effect for safety message (safety first message = 4.07 s. Because the overall pattern of participants' ratings of managers with various outcomes (success, failure, or near-miss) and safety message (safety-first, risk tolerant, or control) did not differ across the population sampled, we used all participant data together in the analyses for hypothesis testing. Important for our hypotheses, the observed main effect for project outcome was qualified by a significant interaction for safety message by project outcome (see Table 3 for means, F (4,366) =3.97, p<0.01).
Hypotheses 1b and 1c predicted that when organizational messages promote risk tolerance for projects, people will only differentiate failure outcomes and not differentiate nearmisses from successes. In our data, this means that our participants (who are observers rating the performance of a manager) will rate managers whose decisions resulted in failure significantly more poorly than managers whose decisions resulted in either a near-miss or a success, and will not distinguish between managers in these latter two conditions. However, safety-first organizational messages will influence people to distinguish near-misses from successes. In our data, this means that our participants will now rate managers whose decisions resulted in a nearmiss significantly lower than managers whose decisions resulted in a success. Figure 2 shows the data graphically, and detailed statistics are shown in Table 3 showing that this time the significance was driven by the managers with near-miss outcomes being rated significantly lower than the mangers with success outcome, supporting Hypothesis 1c.
-----------------
Insert Figure 2 and Table 3 about here
Study 2 Discussion. When organizational messages suggest risk tolerance, observers evaluated managers whose projects ended in a near-miss as highly as managers whose projects ended in success and both of these manager groups were evaluated higher than managers whose projects ended in failure. However, when organizational messages suggest safety-first, observers rated managers whose decisions ended in a near-miss to be equal to managers whose projects end in failure and significantly less favorably than managers whose projects ended in success.
This suggests that organizational messages promoting safety make people distinguish near-miss outcomes from successes and that a simple intervention to promote safety as an organizational value may attenuate the bias towards overlooking near-miss events.
Study 3: Project Significance. We used a 33 factorial design crossing project outcome (success, failure, and near-miss) with project significance (large, small, and control = no information about project size).
Participants and procedure. Participants in Study 3 were NASA managers and contractors (N=149) who participated as part of a training course in project management or as volunteers at a major NASA aerospace conference, as well as MBA students (N=215) who participated in exchange for donations to various student social causes. These participants were different from those in the prior study.
Independent variables:
The three versions of project outcome described above for Study 2 were again used (see Appendix for description). For project significance we incorporated information about cost and time horizon (where longer, more costly projects were proxy for high significance). In the high project significance condition, participants read: 1) The cost of the project is $2 billion with a 7 year schedule, 2) Going back and completing the skipped peer review would delay the schedule by two weeks at a cost of $4 million, and 3) Redesigning the vent would delay the launch by three months at a cost of $48 million. In the low project significance condition participants read: 1) The cost of the project is $200 million with a 36 month schedule, 2) Going back and completing the peer review would delay the schedule by two weeks at a cost of $0.4 million, and 3) Redesigning the vent would require delaying the launch by three months at a cost of $4.8 million.
Dependent variable. The same questions as those used in Study 2 were used to rate Chris. participants' ratings of managers with various outcomes (success, failure, or near-miss) and project significance (small, large, control) did not differ across the population sampled, we used all participant data together in the analyses for hypothesis testing. Important for our hypotheses, the main effect for project outcome is qualified by a significant interaction for project significance by project outcome (see Table 4 for means, F (4,346) =5.37, p<.001).
Hypothesis 2b predicted that when organizational messages suggest a project is not significant, then only failures will be distinguished from successes and near-misses, meaning in our data that participants will rate managers whose decisions resulted in failure significantly lower than managers whose decisions resulted in near-misses and successes. On the other hand, Hypothesis 2c predicted that when organizational messages suggest a project is significant, then near-misses will be distinguished from successes, meaning that mangers whose decisions result in near-misses will be rated significantly lower than managers whose decisions resulted in successes. Figure 3 shows the data graphically, and detailed statistics are shown in Table 4 . An ANOVA of only participants in the control condition with project outcome as the independent variable and ratings of Chris as the dependent variable showed a significant influence of project outcome on the ratings of Chris (F (2,167) =10.99, p<0.001, eta 2 = .12 ) with post-hoc analyses (using Tukey HSD), showing that this significance is driven by the managers with failure outcomes being rated lower than either the managers with success or the near-miss outcomes. An ANOVA of only participants in the insignificant project condition shows no influence of project outcome on ratings of Chris (F (2,99) =.23, p=.79, eta 2 =<.01). As Figure 3 shows, the project manager was rated about equally regardless of the outcome, thus Hypothesis 2b is not supported.
A similar ANOVA of only participants in the high project significance condition showed a significant influence of project outcome on this evaluation of Chris (F (2,89) = 16.21, p<0.001, eta 2 = .27), with post-hoc analyses (using Tukey HSD) showing that observers evaluated managers whose projects ended in success significantly different from both managers whose projects ended in near-misses or in failures. When organizational messages suggested the project was significant, participants began to distinguish near-misses from successes, supporting Hypotheses 2c.
-----------------Insert Figure 3 and Table 4 about here
Study 3 Discussion. Our hypotheses for project significance received mixed support.
There was a significant interaction between project significance and project outcome on evaluations of the project manager. For significant projects, observers did evaluate managers whose projects ended in near-misses significantly poorer than managers whose projects ended in successes, supporting Hypothesis 2c. Yet, for non-significant projects, participants made no distinctions between managers regardless of the project outcome. This finding is consistent with efforts at NASA to treat small projects such as the projects in their Small Explorers (SMEX)
program where each mission costs about $35 million as a training ground for new project managers where new managers can make mistakes and learn from those mistakes. Finally, we note that our cost numbers were constructed to be relevant to the NASA population on which they were tested (and the MBA students primed to think about the NASA context). For other organizations, a $200 million project may seem large or a $2 billion project small.
General Discussion
In our studies, organizational messages were able to change how people processed nearmiss events to correct the outcome bias in near-miss recognition. Specifically, messages specifying safety and project significance both increased people's tendency to distinguish near-misses as different from successes, and to hold mangers somewhat liable when their decisions resulted in near-misses. Thus these messages suggest potential organizational correctives to repair the near-miss bias in individual's decision making.
Of course, in the real-world these two repairs may be naturally correlated. That is, relatively insignificant projects may also be associated with organizational messages that tolerate higher risk, such as corporate "brainstorming" projects that might be developed as part of executive training programs. On the other hand, significant projects may be embedded in a more cautious, safety conscious context, where decisions are more heavily scrutinized. If this naturally occurring covariation occurs in most organizations, then a high cost project may automatically trigger a schema directing attention towards more safety awareness, whereas small-cost projects may trigger schemas that suggest greater freedom and risk tolerance.
Despite any possible covariation, our experiments (which isolated the impact of each factor) demonstrate that both these variables each independently improved the likelihood that decision-makers would differentiate near-miss outcomes from successes. This differentiation suggests that these messages can serve as effective organizational correctives to improve the identification of near-misses.
Implications for Theory
This work contributes to decision making in organizations by suggesting that the perceived decision environment is highly labile and within the control of leaders who promote organizational messages. With very simple primes we were able to increase the vigilance with which people processed near-miss events. These organizational correctives to individual decision making are consistent with past de-biasing work on the influence of contextual cues, and to the proposition that organizations can compensate for individual level biases (Health et al., 1998 ).
This sentiment is typified in the response to the question, "If we are so dumb in our decision making how did we make it to the moon?" with the response, "We didn't make it to the moon, NASA did" (Heath et al., 1998, p. 2) . Our work instantiates that reply, suggesting an ability to improve employee decision making for those who control organizational messaging. In doing so, this paper contributes to the organizational debiasing literature by adding the outcome bias to the list of cognitive biases for which demonstrated organizational correctives exist. This work contributes to the organizational learning literature since organizations must succeed in debiasing individual's perceptions of near-misses in order to improve the ability to learn from near-miss events. As Starbuck (2009, p. 2) notes, "People are unlikely to learn if they think they have nothing to learn." One of the most critical steps in the learning process is the classification of prior experience as success or failure (March et al., 1991) , but it is rare for organizational leaders to give much thought to how near-misses are characterized as successes or failures (Zollo, 2009 ).
Catastrophic events are clear failures, but if organizations wait for these events then it means "lessons learned in blood" (Madsen et al., 2006) . If organizations could learn to stave off disaster by identifying near-misses and improving processes by correcting the conditions that produced the near-misses, the enormous costs of experiencing disaster could be averted, and this research provides direct mechanisms to improve the closer examination of "successful" events for learning opportunities.
This work also contributes to the safety culture literature by proposing and testing mechanisms for enhancing near-misses recognition. The belief that safety cultures that focus on identifying, handling, and communicating errors result in safer organizations is well supported (Edmondson, 1999; Hofmann and Mark, 2006) and establishing an organization that can identify near-miss events and learn from the events is a central (perhaps the central) component to most modern organizational safety systems (Reason, 1997) . Near-miss reporting and analysis of data derived from near-miss systems are thought to present clear opportunities to identify and ameliorate latent errors before the occurrence of a serious accident. However, most commentators agree that near-misses go vastly underreported in most organizations, despite such near-miss reporting systems (Spath, 2007) . Traditional approaches to encouraging near-miss reporting (such as providing incentives to those that report) may not adequately resolve this concern if near-misses are not reported because observers fail to recognize them (e.g., differentiate them from successful performance). The studies presented in this paper indicate two organizational messages that can be used to enhance an organization's safety culture and thus improve near-miss reporting, without requiring additional incentive resources.
These are not the only correctives possible and indeed future research might investigate others. For example, organizations might use accountability to correct for over-reliance on outcomes and under evaluation of the decision process. Accountability refers to the expectation that one may be called upon to provide a satisfactory justification of one's actions to others (Tetlock, 1983) . When people are accountable for their behavior to a legitimate, reasonably well-informed audience whose views are unknown and who is interested in accuracy, they should consider multiple perspectives on the issue and try to anticipate the objections that reasonable others might raise to positions that they take" (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 257) . Holding people accountable broadens their attention in comparison to situations where they would not otherwise use all of the relevant information at their disposal (Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996) . Thus, accountability should also make people more critical in their evaluation of near-miss outcomes, and will be explored in future research.
Implications for Practice
If near-misses masquerade as successes, then organizations and their members will only learn to continue taking the risks that produced the near-miss outcome until a tragedy occurs.
Our results suggest some straightforward organizational repairs to remedy this cycle, such as increasing messages about safety and project significance. Such repairs could be instituted at virtually any organization in which learning from near-misses could prevent future disasters.
For example, our results indicate that decision makers are more likely to recognize nearmisses in large, highly-significant projects than in smaller projects. Obviously, undertaking only large projects is not a viable strategy in most organizations. But, organizational practices that clarify and emphasize the importance of every project undertaken in the organization could effectively promote near-miss recognition.
Finally, safety messages that motivate people to identify near-misses are critical. Advice for constructing a strong safety context is beyond the scope of this paper, but the role of leader behavior, and how they treat those who identify near-misses, is likely to be important. For example, Landau and Chisholm (1995) report an incident in which an enlisted seaman on a U.S.
aircraft carrier reported the loss of a tool on the carrier deck during a combat exercise. (A lost tool on an aircraft carrier deck can be very dangerous if it is sucked into an engine and thus until the tool was found, every successful take-off and landing would be a near-miss.) The exercise was halted and all aloft aircraft were redirected to land bases. However, rather than being punished for his error, the seaman was commended by his commanding officer in a formal ceremony for his bravery in reporting it. Such a demonstration of leadership commitment to safety would support others in identify near-miss events in the future.
Conclusion
Because near-miss events are too often perceived as successes rather than warning signals of a system's vulnerability, organizations can fail to use these forewarnings to prevent future disasters. We identified two organizational messages that can increase critical attention to nearmiss events: safety and project significance. Further research should continue to identify other factors that could enhance recognition from and attention to the underlying factors causing nearmisses with the goal of preventing costly accidents.
APPENDIX: Simulation Materials -NASA's MIST Mission
The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) started a mission called Micro-Imaging Space Telescope (MIST) to study the formation and evolution of galaxies. The mission required a highly powerful, yet somewhat delicate telescope that would be launched into space on a small explorer spacecraft. The mission was run by NASA Goddard under the direction of Chris the MIST mission's Project Manager. The telescope was to be constructed as part of a sub-contract by NASA JPL under the direction of, Jamie, the Instrument Manager. You have been asked to evaluate the decisions Chris has made to accomplish this mission.
Because of the delicacy of the MIST telescope's lens, when the telescope is in the earth's atmosphere the lens is enclosed in a case filled with solid hydrogen. This cover is then carefully ejected once the telescope is in orbit so that the telescope can begin reading data. Although everyone at NASA Goddard and NASA JPL are proud of the development of this innovative telescope and lens protection system, relations between Goddard and JPL personnel have become somewhat strained as JPL, Goddard's sister center, was assigned a subordinate role in this mission. Chris, however has been artful at managing this tension by ensuring that JPL's input is always solicited.
Late in the building process, Jamie was assigned to another project, and was replaced by Terry. This caused some delay in the building process. To recover this lost time, the telescope design team skipped a peer review of the telescope's electronics. Chris ok'd this process.
Tracey, MIST's systems engineer, noticed that the design of the telescope's vents could cause a catastrophic problem. If the hydrogen was discharged at an extremely high-rate (100 times the expected rate), it could exert a destabilizing force on the spacecraft. Tracy mentioned this risk to Chris, adding that the chance of this happening was highly unlikely. A redesign of the vent would require delaying the launch of the mission.
[ Chris is now up for an annual review and you have been asked to evaluate the decision making. a Rating of decision to promote to larger project from 1= Very Bad to 7 = Very Good * Significance according to post-hoc Tukey HSD, two-tailed test 
